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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

On June 1, 2015, the District Court heard oral argument on objections to
commissioner's recommendations. On September 1, 2015, the District Court
entered its Order (the "Order"). A copy of which is attached hereto in the
Addendum. On September 14, 2015, the Appellant ("John") filed a Motion for
Amendment, Correction, and Clarification, and for New Trial. On December 1,
2015, the District Court entered a Memorandum Decision & Order, denying the
motion. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78A-4-103(2)(h), Utah
Code.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
I.{&)

Did the District Court err in finding that under the language of the
Judgment and Decree of Divorce ("Decree"), entered October 8, 2008, that John is
not entitled to reduce his alimony payment based upon Appellee's ("Jackie"'s)
Social Security Award and that both Jackie and John must both receive Social
Security in order for the two awards to be equalized?

3
~
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The applicable standard of appellate review is for correctness. 'A trial
court's resolution of a party's objection to the recommendation of a commissioner
is one of law. We review conclusions of law for correctness.' Gullickson v.

Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83, ,I 14, 301 P.3d 1011 (Utah App. 2013), (quoting
Dent v. Dent, 870 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah Ct.App.1994). "We review the subsidiary
determinations necessary to that resolution according to the standard appropriate
to the issue." Gullickson at ,r 14.
"Generally, Interpretation of a divorce decree
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 2011 UT App 41,
,r 5,248 P.3d 65 (explaining that" [w]e interpret a
divorce decree according to established rules of
contract interpretation," and thus interpretation of a
divorce decree presents a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Cafe' Rio, Inc. v.
Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ,r 21, 207
P.3d 1235 (" We review a district court's interpretation
of a written contract for correctness, granting no
deference to the court below." (footnote citation
omitted)).

Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ,r 14,294 P.3d 600,604.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES

The issue regarding when alimony would be adjusted, or the triggering
event, was preserved in the District Court by John in the Declaration of John
Christensen, R. 275, the Amended Motion for Order to Show Cause, R. 313, the

4
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Objection to Certain Recommendations made by Commissioner on March 19,
2015, R. 411, oral argument on June I, 2015, Addenda D, pg. 3, lines 9-16, and
John's Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Amendment,
Correction, and Clarification, and for New Trial. R. 454.
The issue regarding the need to equalize the Social Security awards, the
measure of the new alimony, was preserved in the District Court by John in the

vJ

Declaration of John Christensen, R. 275, the Amended Motion for Order to Show
Cause, R. 313, the Objection to Certain Recommendations made by Commissioner
on March 19, 2015, R. 411, oral argument on June 1, 2015, Addenda D, pg. 5,
lines 18-24, and John's Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for
Amendment, Correction, and Clarification, and for New Trial. R. 454.

vii)

The issue regarding John's retirement having been awarded to John as his
separate property was preserved in the District Court by John in John's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Amendment, Correction,
and Clarification, and for New Trial and in Response to Petitioner's Opposing
Memorandum. R. 475.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE
**None**

STATUTE AND ORDINANCE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
**None**
5
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the interpretation of the Decree.
The Parties were divorced by way of the Decree on October 8, 2008, which
was primarily based upon an agreement made in mediation.
Cw

The second part of Paragraph 12 of the Decree states:
When the Petitioner becomes eligible to receive Social
Security, alimony will be adjusted to equalize the
Social Security incomes of both of the parties. For
example, if the Respondent's monthly Social Security
incomes is $2,000.00 and the Petitioner's monthly
Social Security incomes is $1,000.00, such shall
require an alimony payment of $500.00 to the
Petitioner to equalize the monthly Social Security
incomes of the parties.

Additionally, Paragraph 9 of the Decree states "The Respondent [John] is
awarded is retirement plans, which include his defined benefit plan and 401k.
On April 29, 29, 2010, Jackie filed her Verified Petition for Modification of
Judgment and Decree of Divorce ("Jackie's Petition"). Little happened on the
case until December 2014, when Jackie filed a request for a scheduling conference
and discovery requests. On January 13, 2015, District Judge Thomas L. Willmore,
who heard the trial and signed the Decree, held a hearing where he recused
himself and the case was reassigned to District Judge Kevin K. Allen.
~

On February 8, 2015, John filed his Motion for Order to Show Cause and
for Temporary Orders and a Motion to Dismiss Jackie's Petition for her failure to
prosecute, both of which were supported by John's Declaration and the Motion to

6
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Dismiss was also supported by a Memorandum. Jackie subsequently filed her
counter Motion for Order to Show Cause, which was supported by her
Declaration.
vJ

Domestic Relations Commissioner Daniel W. Gamer ("Commissioner")
held a hearing on March 19, 2015, and based upon his interpretation of the Decree,
recommended that the triggering event for the Social Security equalization
payment was when both Jackie and John receive Social Security, but then it will
only be the equalization payment of the Social Security. The Commissioner also

vi

dismissed Jackie's Petition for failure to prosecute and made other
recommendations not relevant to this appeal.
Both Jackie and John filed written objections to the Commissioner's
recommendations to the District Court.
On June 1, 2015, the District Court conducted an objection hearing on June

vo

1, 2015, and subsequently issued the Order. The Order ordered four things:

I. "The Petitioner [Jackie] is not entitled to attorney's fees."
~

\.&

2. "The Respondent [John] is not entitled to reduce his alimony
payment based on the Petitioner's [Jackie's] Social Security award."
3. "The language relied upon by the Respondent [John] necessarily
requires that both parties receive Social Security in order for the two
awards to be equalized."
4. "The recommendations are affirmed. Both objections are denied."

John subsequently filed a timely Motion for Amendment, Correction, and
Clarification, and for New Trial on September 14, 2015.
7
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On December 1, 2015, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision
& Order ("Memorandum Decision") , denying John's motion.
The District Court erred in interpreting the Decree as to the triggering
event, not adjusting John's alimony obligation to Jackie, and determining that this
adjustment does not limit John's alimony obligation to an equalization of the
Social Security incomes.
In addition to incorrectly interpreting the Decree, the net effect of the
District Court's ruling is to reallocate the property division and increase the
amount of outside support Jackie receives to meet her budget shortfall.

~

Specifically, upon retirement, John will have two sources of income, Social
Security and his retirement plans. The District Court's Order compels John to not
4lV

only equalize the Social Security incomes, but also forces John to pay Jackie a
portion of his retirement plan benefits. This means upon retirement, instead of
reducing John's alimony obligation as provided for in the Decree, the District
Court increased the obligation. Under the Order, Jackie receives more outside
support to meet her budget shortfall than what is provided for in the Decree.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Jackie and John were divorced by way of a Judgment and Decree of

1.

Divorce on October 8, 2008. R. 222, ,I 4.
I

2.

The Decree provides that it is based upon an agreement made in

mediation. R. 222, ,I 1-3.
8
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3.

Paragraph 12 of the Findings states that Jackie needs $1,100.00 in

outside support in addition to her income. R. 227 ,r 14.

4 ..

The Decree states:
When the Petitioner becomes eligible to receive Social
Security, alimony will be adjusted to equalize the
Social Security incomes of both of the parties. For
example, if the Respondent's monthly Social Security
incomes is $2,000.00 and the Petitioner's monthly
Social Security incomes is $1,000.00, such shall
require an alimony payment of $500.00 to the
Petitioner to equalize the monthly Social Security
incomes of the parties.

Vl

R. 222, ,r 12.
5.

The Decree states: "The Respondent is awarded his retirement

plans, which include his defined benefit plan and 40lk." R. 222, ,r 9.
6.

Jackie became eligible to receive Social Security beginning with the

month of February 2015. R. 275
7.

,r 6.

John provided documentation of what Jackie's and John's Social

Security incomes would be as of the month of February 2015. R. 275, ,r 7 & 9
(Exhibits A & B).
8.

Jackie stated that she could get $937.00 per month in Social

Security. R. 352, ,r 8.
9.

John could receive, as of January 31, 2015, 91.7% of his full benefit

of $1,562.00, which is $1,432.35. R. 275, ,r 7-9 (Exhibits A & B).
10.

On March 19, 2015, the hearing on John's Amended Motion for

Order to Show Cause and Motion to Dismiss and Jackie's counter Motion for
9
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Order to Show Cause. In regards to John's Motion to Dismiss, the Commissioner
stated "On the motion to dismiss the Court is granting the respondent's [John's]
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41-b." . R. 409, Addenda C,
pg. 5, lines 18-22.
11.

In regards to the issue of alimony, the Commissioner stated "I don't

think that the Court can equalize their social security incomes until both parties are
actually receiving social security. And so the $1100 in my mind continues to be

~

paid until both parties start receiving social. security and then the Court under the
example in the decree can equalize their incomes." R. 409, Addenda C, pg. 5,
lines 24-25 and pg., lines 1-4.
12.

Both John and Jackie filed.objections to the commissioner's

recommendations. R. 411 and 417.
13.

The District Court held an objection hearing on June 1, 2015. R.

443.

@

14.

The District Court issued the Order ("Order"), which was entered on

September 1, 201_5. R. 445.
15.

The Order ordered four things:

1. "The Petitioner [Jackie] is not entitled to attorney's fees."

2. "The Respondent [John] is not entitled to reduce his alimony payment
based on the Petitioner's [Jackie's] Social Security award."
3. ''The language relied upon by the Respondent [John] necessarily
requires that both parties receive Social Security in order for the two
awards to be equalized."

10
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4. "The recommendations are affirmed. Both objections are denied."
l..!.iP

16.

John subsequently filed a timely Motion for Amendment,

Correction, and Clarification, and for New Trial on September 14, 2015. R. 448.
17.

On December 1, 2015, the District Court issued a Memorandum

Decision & Order ("Memorandum Decision"), denying John's motion. R. 484.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Decree provides that when Jackie becomes eligible for Social Security,
which she did beginning with the month of February 2015, John's alimony
obligation to her was to be adjusted so that the new alimony is an equalization of
only the two Social Security incomes. The Decree also provides that John was
awarded all of his retirement plans. The District Court's Order increases John's
alimony obligation contrary to the language of the Decree and incorrectly forces a
division of separate property to meet this obligation.

ARGUMENT
v)

Jackie and John attended mediation and came to an agreement. Jackie
subsequently changed her mind such that John sought enforcement of the
agreement. The District Court, after a motion to enforce settlement agreement and
a trial, enforced the settlement agreement and issued the Decree.

11
~
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The Decree provides that Jackie would receive alimony at the rate of
$1,100.00 per month until she became eligible for Social Security and the Bear
Lake property in exchange for John receiving his retirement plans free from any
claim by Jackie.
As part of the implementation of this agreement, upon Jackie becoming
eligible for Social Security, with the month of February 2015, John's alimony
obligation was to be adjusted so as to equalize what each Party would receive from
Social Security.
The District Court erred in interpreting the language of the Decree,
specifically the Order is contrary to the language of the Decree and incorrectly
modifies the terms of the agreement.

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THAT
THE DECREE REQUIRED BOTH PARTIES RECEIVE SOCIAL
SECURITY BEFORE ADJUSTING THE ALIMONY AW ARD

The language of the Decree is very specific. The second portion of
Paragraph 12, Alimony, states:
When the Petitioner becomes eligible to receive Social
Security, alimony will be adjusted to equalize the
Social Security incomes of both of the parties. For
example, if the Respondent's monthly Social Security
incomes is $2,000.00 and the Petitioner's monthly
Social Security incomes is $1,000.00, such shall
require an alimony payment of $500.00 to the
Petitioner to equalize the monthly Social Security
incomes of the parties.

12
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R. 222, if 12. Emphasis added.
~

In the case of Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83, 301 PJd 1011
(Utah App. 2013), one of the issues was the decree of divorce, based upon a
settlement agreement, provided that the wife was permitted to live in the home
until a specified date (for five years) and she was responsible for the two
mortgages during this time. At the end of the period, the triggering date, the

l{!J

husband was to either buy the wife out of her 50% share in the equity or the home
was to be put up for sale. Id at if2.
Almost two years before the triggering date, the wife filed a petition to
modify and a motion for temporary orders seeking an acceleration of the
husband's two options or that she be allowed to rent out the home because she was
moving out of state. Id at if4.
The commissioner did not see that the decree prevented the wife from
renting out the home, so the commissioner recommend that the husband could
either choose to have the wife rent out the home or to accelerate his option to sell
the home, and gave the husband fifteen days from the hearing date to decide. Id at

v;)

if7.
The husband did make an election, under protest, to sell the home. Id at
ifl 1.
On the objection to the recommendation, the district court held the husband
to his election to accelerate the sale of the home and ordered husband to make the
mortgage payments until the home was sold. Id at ,Il3.
13
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On appeal, the husband, because the wife's petition to modify was pending,
requested that the trial court's ruling be reversed because of the shift in
responsibility of the mortgage payments. Id at ,I18.
The Court stated "With regard to a divorce decree's division of the parties'
property, we have noted that courts should modify such provisions 'with great
reluctance' and 'only upon a showing of compelling reasons arising from a
substantial and material change in circumstances'. Id at if21 (quoting Whitehouse
v. Whitehouse, 790 P .2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct.App.1990).

Additionally, "a divorce decree ought to be interpreted according to the
parties' intent as evidenced by the language of the decree." Id at 111. (citing
Osborne v. Osborne, 2011 UT App 150, iJ 6, 260 P.3d 202 (App.201 I).

One of the holdings in Gullickson was that the trial court erred by limiting
the husband's choices regarding the house as provided for under the decree and
shifting the burden of the mortgage payments from the wife to the husband until
the triggering date. The matter was remanded for an evidentiary hearing because
there was a pending petition to modify. Id at ,I25.
In the present case, the Decree states that the triggering date is when Jackie
becomes eligible to receiving Social Security, which was with the month of
February 2015. The Decree does not state that both Parties need to receive Social
Security, as ordered by the District Court.
In sum, the District Court erred when it incorrectly interpreted the language
of the Decree to change the triggering event or date.
14
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ADJUSTING JOHNS
ALIMONY OBLIGATION TO ONLY AN EQUALIZATION OF
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
The District Court erred when it did not adjust John's alimony obligation to

only an equalization of the Social Security benefits for two reasons. First, when it
did not correctly interpret the terms of Paragraph 12 of the Decree that limits
John's alimony obligation upon the triggering event to only an equalization of the
Social Security benefits.
\/8

Second, the District Court erred in interpreting the Decree in that it
effectively makes a reallocation of the agreed upon property division, specifically,
John's retirement benefits that were awarded to him as his separate property.

A. Language ofDecree
The language of the Decree is very specific. The second portion of
Paragraph 12, Alimony, states:
Vii

When the Petitioner becomes eligible to receive Social
Security, alimony will be adjusted to equalize the
Social Security incomes of both of the parties. For
example, if the Respondent's monthly Social Security
incomes is $2,000.00 and the Petitioner's monthly
Social Security incomes is $1,000.00, such shall
require an alimony payment of $500.00 to the
Petitioner to equalize the monthly Social Security
incomes of the parties.
R. 222, ,r 12. Emphasis added.

15
V/D
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In addition to the holding in Gullickson as referenced above, the case of

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 2011 UT App 41, 248 P.3d 65 (Utah App. 2011), is
applicable. In Mitchel, during the marriage the husband had a judgment entered
against him by the FDIC, which judgment was later assigned to MDI Equity
Partners, LLC ("MDI"). Also during the marriage husband and wife obtained a
judgment against an individual by the name of Steven A. Collins ("Collins"). In
exchange for a relinquishment of the MDI judgment against the husband, MDI
accepted the husband unconditional assignment of his interest in the Collins
Judgment to MDI. Id at il 2.
The Decree specified that the husband and wife were each awarded "onehalf of any proceeds received from the Collins lawsuit." Id.
The husband subsequently claimed that he was entitled to one-half of the
net amount the wife received on the Collins judgment. Net amount meaning the
total payment minus the one-third went to the attorney who had represented the
husband and wife as a contingent fee and one-third that went to MDI as part of the
husband's obligation. Id at ,I 3-4.
The trial court ruled that under the terms of the decree, the wife was entitled
to one-third of the total payment, meaning one-third to the attorney, one-third to
MDI, and the remaining one-third to the wife. Id at ,r 4.
On appeal, the Mitchell court stated that "If the language in a decree is
clear, we determine its effect from its plain language." Id at if5.

16
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Cm.,

Additionally, "Where the [contract] language is unambiguous, the parties'
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language." Id.
(quoting Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ,I 10,225 P.3d 185).
vJb

In the present case, second portion of Paragraph 12 to the Decree provides:
When the Petitioner becomes eligible to receive Social
Security, alimony will be adjusted to equalize the
Social Security incomes of both of the parties. For
example, if the Respondent's monthly Social Security
incomes is $2,000.00 and the Petitioner's monthly
Social Security incomes is $1,000.00, such shall
require an alimony payment of $500.00 to the
Petitioner to equalize the monthly Social Security
incomes of the parties.

Emphasis added. R. 222, ,I 12.
Specifically, the Decree states that upon the triggering event, alimony will

be adjusted to equalize the Social Security incomes and which shall require an
alimony payment of the equalized Social Security. The language says alimony
will be adjusted to and that it will require an alimony payment. The two operative
words are to and an, meaning that the language means that upon the triggering
vI>

event, the only alimony payment due is the equalization payment.

To in this context means a change to, moving from one point (pre-trigger
alimony) to another (post-trigger alimony). $1,100.00 to the Social Security
equalization payment.
The Decree states that the equalization payment is an alimony payment.

"An" in this context is a singular term, not plural. This means one payment, the

17
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equalization payment, for alimony, not the pre-trigger alimony and post-trigger
alimony.
Additionally, if it was to be a payment in addition to pre-trigger alimony, it
would have either said that it was additional alimony or it would not have labeled

~

it as alimony.
First, additionally means more. The absence of the word additionally
shows the intent of the Parties, the equalization payment was to be the new
alimony, not in addition to the pre-trigger alimony.
Second, if it was just an equalization payment, it would not have been
labeled as the alimony. This means that this language was intended to replace the
pre-triggering event alimony.

B. John's Separate Property Retirement

Paragraph 9 of the Decree states: "The Respondent is awarded his
retirement plans, which include his defined benefit plan and 40lk." R. 222.
The significances of this is in interpreting the language of the Decree to
determine the intentions are from the plain meaning of the contractual language.
Specifically, the Decree provides that John received his retirement plans, meaning
this is not income to be considered in the payment of alimony, but yet upon
retirement, the only way to continue to pay the pre-trigger alimony in addition to
Social Security would be to draw from these retirement plans. In other words, if it

18
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was the intent to divide the retirement plans or to give Jackie all of the Social
Security, then the Decree would say this.
Jackie stated that she could get $937.00 per month in Social Security. R.
352, ,I 8.
John could receive, as of January 31, 2015, 91.7% of his full benefit of
$1,562.00, which is $1,432.35. R. 275, ilil 7-9 (Exhibits A & B).
This means the combined amount is $2,369.35, which one-half is
$1,184.68, which in tum means that the new alimony payment is $247.68.
In other words, upon the triggering event, Jackie should receive $937.00
from Social Security and $247.35 from John, for a total of $1,184.35. This is in
addition to whatever she may earn on her own.
The District Court's order has the effect of Jackie receiving $93 7. 00 from
Social Security and $247.35 from John and another $1,100.00 from John, for a
total of $2,284.35. Again, this is in addition to whatever she may earn on her own.
Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings")
entered October 8, 2008, states that Jackie needs $1,100.00 in outside support in
addition to her income, her shortfall on her needs. The District Court's Order
more than doubles the amount of outside support Jackie is to receive, and
increases John's to $1,347.35. John in retirement has lower ability to pay but his
alimony obligation was increased.
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The Order was made despite there not being any pending petition to
modify, a finding of a substantial change in circumstance, and no analysis of the
respective needs and abilities to pay of the Parties.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the District Court's Order of September 1, 2015,
and remand this case for further proceedings, with directions to the District Court

~

that John's alimony obligation to Jackie, beginning with the month of February
2015, be adjusted and limited to an equalization payment of one-half of the sum of
the applicable or possible Social Security awards for the two Parties.

STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM
An addendum is attached.

DATED this 4th day of August, 2016.
(tu
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The brief complies with the typeface and typestyle requirements of Rule
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NATHAN HULT-4704
Attorney for Petitioner
110 North 100 East
P.O. Box 543
Logan, Utah 84323-0543
Telephone: (435) 753-7400

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
JACQUELINE E. CHRISTENSEN
Petitioner

*

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF DIVORCE

*

vs.

*

JOHN D. CHRISTENSEN

*

Case No.:

064100474 DA

*

Judge:

THOMAS L. WILLMORE

Respondent

A trial was held on April 22, 2008 before Judge Thomas L. Willmore. The Petitioner was
present with her attorney Nathan Hult. The Respondent was present with his attorney Jonathan
~

Thomas. The parties presented testimony, evidence, and argwnents to the court concerning the
issues of the divorce. At the conclusion of the divorce, the court ruled on some of the issues, but
took under advisement for decision the following issues: Whether a binding mediation agreement
was reached on June 28, 2007, amount of alimony, income of the parties, payment of debts,
division of retirement plans, and attorney's fees. The court thereafter entered its decision on June

23, 2008.
In addition, the court held a status conference on September 8, 2008 at which time the court
gave further guidance with regards to specific details to be included in the Findings and Decree.
Based upon that decision, and rulings on some issues at trial, the court finds and orders as follows:
Judgment and Decree of Divorce
Case No.
Page I of
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ENT'D OCT B 2008 ¾

I.

The parties entered into an agreement which was recorded at the close of the

mediation session with Stephen Jewell on June 28, 2007.
2.

Said agreement covered the issues of alimony, a residence in Cache County, Bear

Lake property, trailer, and vehicles. It also covered the issues of personal property, payment of
debts, and attorney's fees.
3.

The court finds that the verbal recorded agreement is sufficient under the new Utah

Supreme court case of Reese vs. Tingey Construction, in which the Utah Supreme Court provided
that a recorded verbal agreement can fulfill a requirement that mediated agreements be in writing.
Therefore, based upon the court's finding that there was an agreement, the court now makes and
enters the following:
4.

DIVORCE. The Petitioner is granted a divorce from the Respondent the same to

become final upon the signing and filing thereof.
5.

CHILDREN. Three children have been born issue of this marriage but all are

6.

RESIDENCE IN LOGAN. The Petitioner is awarded sole possession of the

adults.

residence at 336 West 200 South, Logan, Utah. The property is titled to one of the parties'
daughters.
7.

BEAR LAKE PROPERTY. The parties own a trailer lot located at 2926 S.

Edgemont Dr., Lot 14, Garden City, further described as follows:
Lot 14 Sweetwater Park Trailer & Camper phase I, II, III, as
shown by the official plat of said subdivision filed December 5,
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Jacqueline Christensen vs. John Christensen
Case No. 064100474
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1986 as filing nwnber 34333, in book GS, pg 579, in the office of
the recorder of Rich County, Utah,
that is awarded to the Petitioner together with the two trailers that are on that property.

8.

PERSONAL PROPERTY. The Petitioner is awarded the 1998 Toyota Camry,

the furnishing of the residence, and the rest of the personal property at the residence located at
336 West 200 South, Logan, Utah, and remaining property in the storage shed and the bank
accounts in her name.
The Respondent is awarded the GMC pickup, his tools, personal belongings, and all of the
other personal property that is presently in his possession and the bank accounts in his name.
9.

RETIREMENT BENEFITS. The Respondent is awarded his retirement plans,

which include his defined benefit plan and 401k.
~

10.

DEBTS. The Petitioner shall be responsible for all of the debts in her name. The

Respondent shall be responsible for all of the debts in his name. Any medical bills shall be the
responsibility of the party that received the medica] care.
The only debts in the joint names of the parties are a possible deficiency judgment on a
foreclosure by Countrywide and a claim by the IRS for FICA taxes on a personal injury settlement
of the Petitioner's in connection with 2005 truces which is contested and may be resolved with the
VP

assistance of the parties' accountant A.a,y responsibility for these possible debts sha11 be equally
shared by the parties.
11.

SECURITY FOR DEBTS. Both parties shall be entitled to security for the debts

required to be paid by the other party. The Respondent is granted a lien on the Bear Lake property

Judgment and Decree of Divorce
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Case No. 064100474
Page 3 of5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which is located at 2926 S. Edgemont Dr., Lot 14, Garden City, Utah and more fully described
above.
The Petitioner is granted a lien on the personal property of the Respondent including but
not limited to his GMC pickup and his retirement benefits, if permitted by ERISA.
12.

ALIMONY. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner $1,100 per month in

alimony effective July 1, 2007. The court finds that it is a reasonable and proper amount based
upon the evidence provided to the court at trial concerning the parties' incomes, ability to pay, and
the needs of each party set forth in their monthly budgets. The Respondent has been paying a
mortgage payment on behalf of the Petitioner in lieu of alimony. If either party believes there has
been an underpayment or overpayment of the alimony in this regard, they shall provide an
accounting to the other. The parties shall then make an adjustment for any underpayment or
overpayment of alimony since July 1, 2007 to the present.
When the Petitioner becomes eligible to receive Social Security, alimony will be adjusted to
equalize the Social Security incomes of both of the parties. For example, if the Respondent's
monthly Social Security income is $2,000 and the Petitioner's monthly Social Security income is
$1,000, such shall require an alimony payment of $500 to the Petitioner to equalize the monthly
Social Security incomes of the parties.
13.

ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. Given the incomes of the parties and their

ability to pay, the court orders that each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and cc,sts..

DATE:_~IO~/~r~{o_Y_ _ __

~i~Jl~:··•
Thomas L. Willmore,istrict Judge: ·
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31 Federal A venue
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Amy s.i@"erson, Legal Assistant
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

JACQUELINE E. CHRISTENSEN,

ORDER

Petitioner,
Case No. 064100474
V.

"'

Judge Kevin K. Allen

JOHN D. CHRISTENSEN,
Respondent.

THIS MATIER IS BEFORE THE COURT pursuant to Petitioner's Objection to Certain
Recommendations of March 19, 2015, and Respondent's Objection to Certain Recommendations
Made by Commissioner on March 19, 2015. In preparation of this decision the Court has
reviewed the parties respective pleadings, each document submitted before the Court, and the
applicable case law, rules, and statutory provisions. Having considered the forgoing, the Court
issues this Order.
The Court heard oral arguments on June 1, 2015. Initially, the Court entered a ruling
that denied both motions and affirmed the Commissioner's recommendations. Counsel
expressed concerns with the ruling, and the Judge heard those concerns in chambers. After
reviewing the record, and re-visiting the concerns, the Court finds:
lji)

1. The Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees.
2. The Respondent is not entitled to reduce his alimony payment based on the Petitioner's
Social Security award.
3. The language relied on by the Respondent necessarily requires that both parties receive
Social Security in order for the two awards to be equalized.

~
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The recommendations are affinned. Both objections are denied. No further order is

necessary to effectuate this decision.

DATED this

,t-

BYTHEC

T:

day of August, 2015.

Ju
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT - LOGAN
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..,
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______________
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3

P R O C E E D I N S

1

THE COURT:

2

....
...,

Call the Christiansen case on the record.

3

Both parties are before the Court.

4

counsel.

We're here today on the respondent's motion to

5

dismiss.

And then also the petitioner filed an order to show

6

cause and respondents filed an order to show cause.

7

your pleadings.

8

me that I haven't read, I'm ready to ·rule.

9

10
11

12
13
14

Each represented by

I've read

Unless there's something else you want to tell

MR. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

I'll take your ruling.
Anything else that I haven't read in the

pleadings you want to state, Mr. Malouf?
MR. THOMAS:

Well, actually I do have one thing, but

I'll let M~. Malouf go first.
MR. MALOUF:

I believe that it's extremely clear that

15

the divorce decree, Paragraphs 12 and 13, nowhere state that

16

the $1100 a month alimony ends because Jackie is eligible for

17

social security.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. MALOUF:

20

21
22
23

I believe I read that in your argument.
And -- yeah, I don't think there's any

other interpretation, but from the example to say that -THE COURT:

Yeah, there's other interpretations that

can be made.
MR. MALOUF:

But the most logical one is that when

24

they are both getting social security, then there needs to be

25

an adjustment of the alimony amount so that they each get the
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

same amount of social security.
THE COURT:

2
3

I read that in your argument.

Is there

something you want to tell me that I haven't read?

4

MR. MALOUF:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. THOMAS:

You've read all my arguments?
I did.

One small thing is I actually ran the

7

numbers with her -- with her representation that she's making

8

$937 in social security.

9

equalizing it of the $247.68, that actually gives her $1184.68

Actually when we calculated with

10

which is more than what she's receiving now.

11

that in the pleading.
THE COURT:

12

That's about the only new thing to add.
All right.

And as I understand it, your

13

client is not receiving social security.

14

his job?

15

MR. THOMAS:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. MALOUF:

All right.
You need to understand she is not

receiving either.

19

and she's not receiving anything.

21
22
23

He's still working

Yes.

18

20

I didn't specify

She has applied, but so far she's suspended

THE COURT:

Okay.

When is she going to start

receiving it?
MR. MALOUF:

Well, she would like to wait until she's

at full retirement age.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. MALOUF:

Okay.
Now the other thing is

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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THE COURT:

1
2

application?

3

MR. MALOUF:

4

THE COURT:

5

Well, did she then pull back her

Well, if you apply, you can suspend.
Oh, okay.

So it's in suspension right

now?
MR. MALOUF:

6

Yeah.

Now, there was something they

vjj

v;j

,...

...

7

pointed out.

The petition to modify, in her affidavit she said

8

she signed it in April of 2006.

9

petition to modify was signed by her attorney April 27 th ,

It's very clear that the

10

2010 and the April 27 th , 2006 date was the date the notary

11

put on there, but it's a typographical error.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MALOUF:

Okay.
The application was signed in

14

April 2000 -- well, anyway April 2010 and the answer was filed

15

in --

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. MALOUF:

18

THE COURT:

In May.
-- May 2010.
Right.

On the motion to dismiss the

19

Court is granting the respondent's motion to dismiss for

20

failure to prosecute under Rule 41-b.

21

convinced by the arguments and the law that was presented by

22

Mr. Thomas' brief and I'm granting that motion.

23

I was persuaded and

With regards to the alimony, I agree with the

24

petitioner's position.

I don't think that the

25

that the Court can equalize their social security incomes until
COURT
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I don't think

,.,
6

1

both parties are actually receiving social security.

And so

2

the $1100 in my mind continues to be paid until both parties

3

start receiving social security and then the Court under the

4

example in the decree can equalize their incomes.

5

with her on that position.

6

paying, and you are working, you will continue to pay.

I

..,

So the $1100 that you have been

So I do agree, Mr. Malouf, with your argument there.

7

..,

So I agree

8

There is one other issue I think with the disbursement of funds

9

from Countrywide.

10

MR. THOMAS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. THOMAS:

Yes.
Go ahead make that argument if you would.
All right.

Your Honor, they received

13

about $4000 from a Countrywide settlement, the financial

14

crisis, all the sort of lending problems they had.

15

they each took a thousand dollar disbursement so there's about

16

$2100 left.

Right now

.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.
The problem is is if you look at the

19

decree, it says like there's still

20

mortgages, okay?

21

foreclosed.

22

okay?

23

deficiency or something on the second to Countrywide which they

24

will share equally.

25

okay.

They had two

Their first was by Countrywide which got

They also had a second which was by Countrywide,

In the degree it says there's also a potential

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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MR. THOMAS:

1

,..
(iJ

2

remember where in Texas.

3

off and on.

4

what was going on.

5

ahead and let John pay it off.

6

were finally able to push him off, but it incurred about a

7

little over $1400 in attorney's fees, $1440, but the decree

8

says that they are going to split that obligation.

9

first --

I had to deal with him extensively

I kept Mr. Hult involved in that or informed of
He looked at the letter and said oh yeah go

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. THOMAS:

12

Jackie is fine with that.

THE COURT:

14·

MR. THOMAS:

Well, no.

It just says split the

Oh, okay.
What I'm saying is my client had to do

all the defense.

16

incurred $1440 in attorney's fees.

17

that she pay half of those attorney's fees.

20

The petitioner didn't do anything.

THE COURT:

He

I think it's reasonable

Do you have an affidavit to that effect

that he incurred the attorney fees?
MR. THOMAS:

I can put that if you'd like.

21

saying I went through my time.

22

because he got the wills.

23

So the

Split the attorney fee obligation?

15

19

We

obligation if Countrywide comes after them.

13

18

lib

Well, Mr. Dick O'Neal out of -- I don't

THE COURT:

I'm just

It's in my client's declaration

All right.

So you're saying that she

24

should be paying half of that, $700 plus, half of that, and

25

then divide equally the remainder?
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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..,

1

MR. THOMAS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MALOUF:

Yeah.
Mr. Malouf.
Paragraph 10 of the decree addresses the

4

possibility of the claim by Countrywide, the possible

5

deficiency judgment on foreclosure by Countrywide.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. MALOUF:

Uh-huh.
Now, attached to Jackie's affidavit of

8

February 20 th , 2015, there's a copy of the only documents

9

that reached or show any kind of agreement by the parties.

10

what those documents show is that there was a stipulation in

11

December 2011 to deposit the $4,102 in Jonathan's trust

12

account.

13

of November 23 rd saying time is of the essence.

14

deposit it, it's going to lapse so sign the stipulation and

15

we'll worry about the details later.

16

And

This is prompted by his letter which is also copied
If we don't

This is how I interpret the letter, but he does

17

claim one caveat and that is if John has to declare the income

18

as his under a 1099 for tax purposes, that fairness would say

19

they should equalize it.

20

not part of the degree.

21

on the subject of attorney's fees to resolve and get that.

22

That's not in the letter nor is it in the stipulation to

23

deposit the funds and so

24
25

THE COURT:

That was not ever agreed to.

It's

There's no foot in the door, however,

Why were the attorney's fees needed to

secure the -- why were the attorney's fees necessary to secure
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

the funds?
MR. THOMAS:

2

f!q

3

more thing.

4

which they received a settlement

And I also left out one

Again, there was the first which was Countrywide

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. THOMAS:

Right.
-- of $4,100.

I was fighting Dick

7

O'Neal on the second which was also Countrywide because we knew

8

at the time of the divorce there was a first and there was a

9

second.

We didn't know -- because on the second it's a

10

the first when it's foreclosed, basically you take the

11

property.

on

That's the deal.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. THOMAS:

Right.
On the second it's a personal obligation

14

and they are more likely to come after you and sue you on the

15

promissory note.

16

them, really John, and then it worked out to defend both of

17

them against Dick O'Neal, but also one thing that's in the

18

pleadings, though, is John got the 1099 for the $4102 so he got

19

taxed on it.

And so what I'm saying is I had to defend

He paid income tax on that money.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.
And that is a total of $661.

So

22

considering he paid the taxes I think he should be reimbursed

23

for that or at least half of that because he paid the taxes.

24

understand they are suggesting that everybody files amended

25

taxes.

VP

vJ

Two things.

I don't think it's reasonable at this point.
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I'm not

I

10

1

sure they can at this point because it's been so long, but on

2

the attorney's fees I had to defend them on the second

3

Countrywide.

4

principal amount was like 30 or $40,000.

5

coming after it and I had

This is what was incurred because I think the

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. THOMAS:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. THOMAS:

11

THE COURT:

MR. THOMAS:

14

THE COURT:

MR. THOMAS:

THE COURT:

19

MR. THOMAS:

20

promissory note on -THE COURT:

21

exactly?

And you successfully defended that.

What

They went away.
They went away.

Okay.

And so there's no

No, it's gone.

The statute has now

Well, that's good.
Yeah, but they both signed the

And you're saying -- how much was it

$1400?

23

MR. THOMAS:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yes, they were both on the --

expired on that.

18

22

There would have been a deficit in both

second mortgage deficiency?

16
17

Yes.

was the resolution of that?

13

15

They would have come after both of them?

their names had you not defended that?

10

12

Dick O'Neal was

$1440 on attorney's fees.
And you're saying all that was directed

toward defending the deficiency on the second mortgage which
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

was a benefit to both parties?

2

MR. THOMAS:

3
~

years.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.
But the $661 is the taxes.

It was $630

6

in taxes and $31 in interest and so that's what we're asking

7

for.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. THOMAS:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. MALOUF:

Half the taxes, half the attorney's fees?
Yes, your Honor.
Mr. Malouf.
Well, I can see the equitable argument

12

on the taxes, but there's not -- I don't see it on the

13

attorney's fees because even Jonathan now just said that a lot

14

of it was dealing against the successor of Countrywide.

15

MR. THOMAS:

I didn't say that.

16

MR. MALOUF:

What's his name, Dick?

17

MR. THOMAS:

Dick O'Neal.

18

MR. MALOUF:

Dick O' Neal.

19

,..

It actually went on for a couple of

It's not a person.

It's

the name of the company.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. MALOUF:

Right.
And Jackie wasn't part of the decision

22

nor was she consulted.

23

way we're incurring these fees.

24

half.

25

trust account after he said well maybe we're going to need to

I haven't seen any letter saying by the
We're expecting you to pay

Nothing came out until after the money was in Jonathan's
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1

adjust their taxes, but he didn't say plus John incurred a lot

2

of attorney's fees to get this resolution.

3

their claim.

4

the $4100 came out of it, but going away is one thing.

5

(Inaudible) $4100 may or may not have been related to that.

And I'm not sure because I wasn't part of it how

THE COURT:

6

They went away with

But she benefited from them going away.

7

Mr. Thomas is saying it took $400 to have them go away.

8

Otherwise, there could have been a deficit assessed against

9

both your client and Mr. Thomas' client.

MR. MALOUF:

10

That's true, but my client had bad

11

health.

12

consulted about the fee.

13

She wasn't working (inaudible) and she wasn't

THE COURT:

John has more

I understand.

That's why he paid it.

14

Now (inaudible) and he's just saying can I get half of that

15

back because your client benefited from it.

16

equitable argument before the Court.

17

that relief.

18

and half the attorney's fees and then the balance can be

19

divided between the parties.

That's a good

I am going to grant him

He'll get half of the contribution for the taxes

20

MR. THOMAS:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

If he's behind in his alimony, and I get

iaq

22

the impression that he is based upon what he's paid because of

23

his calculations, I want that caught up.

24

continue to pay the $1100 until they both, at least in my

25

judgment, are on social security and then the Court can offset
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

their incomes or equalize their incomes is what I'm trying to

2

say.

3

MR. THOMAS:

Understood.

4

MR. MALOUF:

So we have asked that he be found in

5

contempt in order to pay (inaudible) alimony.

6

(Someone is turning paper pages in the microphone and

7

I am not able to hear what Mr. Malouf is saying.)

8

THE COURT:

pi,)

9

I'm not going to hold him in contempt

because I think it was the interpretation that they made that I

10

just disagree with.

And you know what?

11

objection and go up before a district court judge who may

12

disagree with what I'm rendering today, but I don't know how we

13

apply an equalization of social security until both parties

14

receive their social security.

15

convincing in your argument, but I expect him to get caught up

16

and continue to pay the $1100.

That's -- I mean that was

17

How far behind is he now.

18

MR. MALOUF:

19

Well, he didn't pay $550 of the $1100 in

January and he's not paid February or March.

20

MR. THOMAS:

21

January is incorrect.

22

pay the $1100.

23

They can file an

THE COURT:

That's incorrect.

That analysis for

He is correct for February.

So we'll get it caught up.

He didn't

And the only

24

obligation you have, sir, is to now pay the $1100 until the

25

Court rules otherwise.
COURT
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1

MR. THOMAS:

So what's your understanding of the

2

social security?

3

security now even, he still is supposed to pay the $1100?

Are you saying if she starts drawing social

4

THE COURT:

Yes.

5

MR. THOMAS:

6

THE COURT:

I understand what you're saying.
Yes, the language could have been better

7

because what it says is when petitioner is eligible, and they

8

go to the example.

9

64, she's 62, he's gonna start collecting social security

10

first.

I think what they anticipated is that he's

That's how I read into it.

11

MR. THOMAS:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. THOMAS:

14

THE COURT:

15

can disagree.

I understand.
I'm not arguing with you but.
I believe this is where reasonable minds

You have my interpretation.

16

MR. THOMAS:

17

THE COURT:

18

We read it differently.

Understood.
And if you'll draft an order to this

effect.

~

19

MR. THOMAS:

20

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
And then if either of you disagree

21

{inaudible), you have 14 days to file an objection.

22

course, Mr. Malouf, your client can now file a petition to

23

modify if she chooses to do so.

24

prior petition for failure to prosecute.

25

MR. MALOUF:

And of

The Court is dismissing the

I understand the Court's ruling.
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1

..,

to point out we did refer to a case in her affidavit --

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MALOUF:

4

I read it .
-- which said neither party moved on it

so it's not fair to dismiss.
THE COURT:

5

Well, fact discovery has now expired and

6

your client said well it took me four years to get the courage

7

to proceed.

8

because of the possible detriment.

9

pointed out is if she's successful, it goes back four years and

That's not a legal basis to keep the case alive
I mean, the prejudice they

10

all of a sudden he's tagged with a big bill.

11

around and file an amended petition to modify.

She can turn

And the case law that they presented to the Court was

12
13

in my mind more applicable and more persuasive.

14

the motion based upon that brief that you filed which was an

15

excellent brief.

16

Counsel.

17

I'm granting

Both your briefs were excellent.

Thank you,

You don't have to agree, but you have an order.
MR. THOMAS:

I understand.

Thank you.

18

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

19

MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)

20

21
22
23

24
25
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1

PROCEEDINGS

2

....

THE COURT:

...

This is the time set for an objection

3

hearing.

4

conunissioner's findings.

5

~

Mr. Thomas, I believe it was your objection to the

MR. THOMAS:

Go ahead.

Okay.

Well, I believe the petitioner

6

also filed an objection to it.

Our objections, we had two.

7

really only have one, but something that's changed since then

8

is our objection was the way the commissioner interpreted the

9

decree is the decree is very specific when it says when the

We

10

petitioner becomes eligible to receive social security, alimony

11

will be adjusted.

12

What the commissioner did is he decided to change it

13

to when the petitioner and the respondent actually receive

14

social security.

15

January of this year which means she became eligible to receive

16

social security in February.

17

is when she becomes eligible, what you do is you take what she

18

would receive, what the respondent would receive and basically

19

add it together and divide it and you equalize it.

What happened is the petitioner turned 62 in

And so what the degree provides

That's what the decree says, but the commissioner I

20

21

believe made a mistake which he changed the meaning of the

22

language of the decree and basically said it's when they both

23

start receiving social security.

24

with that.

25

retire until he's about 69 because if she decides to wait until

And there's several problems

One of them is it means that my client really can't
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1

she's like 66 and a half, since he's older, he couldn't retire

2

until he's 69.

That's contrary to the --

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. THOMAS:

Why?
Why?

Because he couldn't financially

1-r

5

afford it because the alimony is $1100 a month.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. THOMAS:

Yes, it's $1100 a month right now.

And

8

so if he's getting like say $1300, 1500 in social security, you

9

take $1100 out of it, you're left with like 400 bucks, so as a

10

practical matter he can't retire, okay?
Two, if you look at the decree and the language, what

11
~

Right now?

12

the language of the decree is based upon is the mediation that

13

the parties attended.

14

additional alimony, my guy got his retirement, she got the

15

(inaudible), things like that.

16

petitioner changed her mind and I had to file a motion to

17

enforce.

18

okay.

19

I'll decide afterwards.

~

And what happened is then the

At the time what Judge Willmore did is he's like

I'm going to wait on this.

Let's have a trial and then

Well, Judge Willmore came back and said a deal is a

20
~

And what it was is the deal was she got

21

deal.

This is what you did.

This is what the deal was.

These

22

are the trades.

23

as found by Judge Willmore is that when the petitioner becomes

24

eligible

25

security.

r--1

And part of the deal was at the mediation and

we all know when eligibility begins with social
It's 62.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. THOMAS:

Why didn't they just say 62?
One, I would assume it's because we just

3

all know this, and this is the language Judge Willmore chose to

4

use.

5

Willmore found.

6

is right now if you look through her affidavit, she's reading

7

this that she wants a windfall.

8

claiming social security and get the $1100, okay?

Eligible is eligible.

9

62 is eligible.

That's the law of the case.

That's what Judge
The other thing

She wants to be able to start

Right now is the commissioner has changed the meaning

10

of the decree.

11

petitioner becomes eligible to receive social security.

12

what the decree says.

13
14

The decree is very specific.

THE COURT:

MR. THOMAS:

16

THE COURT:

18

That's

So right now she gets $1100 a month in

alimony?

15

17

It says when the

Yes, your Honor.
What would it be under your

interpretation?
MR. THOMAS:

Well, what she's put in her affidavit is

19

she's eligible to receive, I believe, $997 in social security.

20

And then I figured out what my guy would have gotten which

21

would be -- the rate now presently it would be $1432.35.

22

he's not retiring, it will go up later when he does retire.

23

he would basically be paying $247.68.

24

actually getting more money under our calculations.

25

Since

So basically she's

She's getting about a thousand dollars from social
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1

security and she'd get $247.68 so that's $1,247.68 that she's

2

getting.

3

Does that make sense?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. THOMAS:

6
7

8
9

10

11
faJ

That's more than the $1100.

12

Uh-huh.
And so she's eligible to get $937 right

now.
THE

COURT:

Well, she'd be getting less alimony from

your client.
MR. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Right.
But her income would be higher is what

you're saying?
MR. THOMAS:

Yeah, because what we did is Judge

~

13

,..,

Willmore -- one is he did a couple --

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. THOMAS:

But she's not working right now, right?
Yeah, I believe she hasn't had a job for

16

like four or five years is my understanding, but at the time,

17

your Honor, the Court made a determination of what her earning

18

ability is, what her needs.were, and it determined the

19

increase, but Judge Willmore said it both ways.

20

deals a deal and (inaudible) so definitely $1100 meets her

21

needs so she's actually going to get more under the decree than

22

what her needs are.

23

24
25

THE COURT:

He said a

So you're saying that if we use the

commissioner's interpretation, she's going to be getting -MR. THOMAS:

About $1900.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. THOMAS:

3

You basically take $937 you add $1100.

That's almost $2,000 a month, but either way
THE COURT:

4
5

And how do you calculate that?

minute.

Okay.

Wait a minute.

Wait a minute.

Wait a

So she's getting $1100 a month now?

6

MR. THOMAS:

7

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
I guess it seems to me she'd be getting

8

an additional 240 something so it would be $1300.

9

to figure out how you got the $1900.

10

MR. THOMAS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.

She gets 987.

I'm trying

I'm sorry.

For social security?
Yes.

Sorry.

937 in social security.

13

And then based upon the language of the decree, if you equalize

14

what my guy would get in social security and what she gets, he

15

would owe her $247.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.
Okay.

That's one way to get there, but

18

right now the way the commissioner is doing it is she still

19

gets the $1100, but then you add the 937

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. THOMAS:

22
23

24

25

Where does the 937 come from?
That's what she can get in social

security.
THE COURT:

And you're saying that your client has to

pay that under your interpretation?
MR. THOMAS:

No, I'm saying she gets both.

Basically
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1

all of a sudden her income has gone up substantially.

2

is she getting $1100, but she'd also be getting 937 from Social

3

Security because what the decree requires is when she becomes

4

eligible, we equalize the social security.

5
6

THE COURT:

Not only

But if she were working, she'd be making

an income, right?

7

MR. THOMAS:

8

THE COURT:

Yeah.

rat

9

Plus the $1100 in alimony, right?

Because the $1100 is not based on zero income.

10

MR. THOMAS:

It's not, but actually I 1 m going to say

11

no to that because the decree is very specific.

12

the petitioner becomes eligible.

13

THE COURT:

It says when

That's the deal they cut.

Well, it's not necessarily a windfall,

14

though.

I mean because if she were working, she'd have

15

whatever it was.

16

bucks a month approximately.

17

and she's going to be making more than what she'd get in her

18

social security.

Let's say it's minimum wage, right?

MR. THOMAS:

19

Okay.

So you add the alimony to that

But right now the Court has found

20

what her reasonable earning ability is.

21

$1600.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. THOMAS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. THOMAS:

1300

I believe it was about

Okay.
And she's chosen not to work.
Okay.
I don't think her choice not to work
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1

basically increases my client's obligation to pay her.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. THOMAS:

4

THE COURT:

5

Right.
-- she'd still be getting more than $1100

a month.

6

MR. THOMAS:

7

THE COURT:

8

But if she were working

Right.
So it's not really a windfall.

The

social security is just replacing the income.

9

MR. THOMAS:

·Well, let's put it this way -- okay.

10

Yeah, you're right.

11

a replacement, but right now she's capable of working.

12

think on the decree she makes like 14, $1600, but then you add

13

$1100 to that and you add $900 to that, that's what she wants

14

to get.

15
16

THE COURT:
Social Security?

And I

But if she's working, how can she collect

It would be reduced.

MR. THOMAS:

17

If we basically count that, yeah, that is

It would be reduced slightly.

Not much.

18

There's not that big of a reduction, but right now the decree

19

provides when she becomes eligible, we take what she can get in

20

social security, what he can get in social security, and you

21

equalize.

22

deal that Judge Willmore said I'm going to enforce that.

23

That's what he found.

24

25

That was the deal they cut in mediation.

THE COURT:

That's the

Well, and that may be the case, but your

arguments that she gets a windfall aren't necessarily accurate
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...
1

because

2

MR. THOMAS:

3

THE COURT:
have income.

5

income she has right now.

The social security is not over and above what

MR. THOMAS:

Right, but right now there's been --

7

okay.

8

things like that, but right now she could work, though, but

9

right now regardless she's eligible for social security.

10

...

Well, if she were working, she'd still

4

6

pq

It's a potential windfall.

We're going to get into the petition to modify and

That

was the deal they cut.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. THOMAS:

All right.

Mr. Malouf.

I'm sorry, your Honor.

One last thing.

13

New information has come to light since our appearing before

14

the commissioner.

15

of about $4200 on a Countrywide settlement because of -- you

16

know what I'm talking about?

One of the issues is they got a settlement

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. THOMAS:

Right.

Right.

And one of the things commissioner

19

ordered, and I believe they agreed to it, is my client, he got

20

tagged with all the income.

21

government.

22

copy to Mr. Malouf.

23

after this many years now they are seeking $281.84, okay?

24

don't know why it takes so long to sort things out with the tax

25

commission .

It was $661 to the federal

He just barely got this, and I've just given a
This is the State of Utah all of a sudden
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. THOMAS:

3

THE COURT:

4

6

MR. THOMAS:

THE COURT:

8

MR. THOMAS:

10

Yeah, they basically tagged him all with

Did he split the -Well, we got the $4000.

$4200, sorry.

They each took a thousand dollars so there was about $2200
left.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. THOMAS:

13

So you got tagged with all the income

it.

7

9

This is sort of the same thing.

because it was under his social security number?

5

..,

Yeah, me neither.

Okay.
But what the commissioner ordered is

reimburse my guy for half the taxes.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. THOMAS:

Right.
And then basically I had to fight with a

16

guy named -- there was a first and second on the decree.

17

Countrywide came after the second, they were going to split

18

that obligation equally.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. THOMAS:

If

Uh-huh.
Well, I had to fight with a guy named

21

Dick O' Neal out of Texas.

22

attorney's fees which Commissioner Garner said you guys are

23

going to split because I was defending a marital liability.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. THOMAS:

I incurred about $1400 in

Okay.
And so that's been there.
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1

this will actually put them in the hole with what's left in my

2

trust account.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. THOMAS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. THOMAS:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. THOMAS:

Is that a tax obligation?
Yes.
From the State of Utah?
Yeah.
You say it's $600.

fa!

9

one is $281.84.

Well, the federal one was $661.

This

Mr. Malouf just made a good point, though.

10

believe what he told me before this hearing is he thinks that

11

maybe the statute of limitations has run on this.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. THOMAS:

14

I

Probably not on taxes unfortunately.
I don't remember the statute of

limitations for taxes to be honest with you.
THE COURT:

15

Well, the federal government is three

16

years for fraud, but it's ten years for mistake and so I

17

suspect it's the same thing for the State of Utah.

18

MR. THOMAS:

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

I don't know.

In other words, they can't charge you

20

with fraud or things like that three years after you file your

21

taxes.

22

MR. THOMAS:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Okay.
But they can come after you for ten years

for any taxes they think you owe.
MR. THOMAS:

Okay.

Yeah, I don't know the state.
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1

THE COURT:

2

unfortunately.

3

we can address that as well.

4

Yeah, it's very irritating.

MR. MALOUF:

All right.

Well,

Mr. Malouf.

Thank you, your Honor.

I was only

5

thinking of the three year statute of limitations on taxes.

6

And if this is a 2011 tax return filed April of 2012, then it

7

would have been beyond three years.

8

9

THE COURT:

Yeah, if they wanted to go after them for

a false tax return or fraud or something like that, they only

10

have three years, but go ahead.

11

MR. MALOUF:

The letter was May 22 nd , and Jonathan

12

handed me a copy this morning, and the State of Utah wants $282

13

from John.

14

even though it's a comparatively little issue just since that

15

was the last thing we were talking about.

Now, in the decree -- I want to address that issue

The $4200 that they got in resolving that Countrywide

16

181

I suspect it's the same as the federal

17

refund, of that Jackie has only got $1000.

18

gone to John or Jonathan.

19

would each take a thousand dollars and then divide the rest

20

later.

21

wanted attorney's fees for having to protect that claim.

They originally agreed that they

And then when it came to later, Jonathan said well he

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. MALOUF:

Well --

24

MR. THOMAS:

I object.

25

Everything else has

And it sounds like he was awarded that.

This wasn't objected to from

the commissioner's recommendation.
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1

THE COURT:

Yeah, so why are we talking about it now?

2

MR. MALOUF:

Because Jonathan brought it up and wants

4

MR. THOMAS:

No.

5

THE COURT:

3

.....

explaining where it went.

7

re-litigate it.

8

MR. MALOUF:

9

with my client again.

....

No .

No, he's just explaining -- he was just

6

I don't think he wanted to

It's not equitable that he divide that
He's already got what he asked for

10

before.

11

then, but I do point out as a matter of equity the decree

12

doesn't award attorney's fees for protecting that right.

Life is short.

We didn't make an issue of what it was

13

THE COURT:

But you do want to re-litigate it then?

14

MR. MALOUF:

No, I'm just saying it's not fair that

15

...

$281 more.

he bring it up.

We don't want to help pay part of that $281.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. MALOUF:

Okay.
I'm not trying to get back what he's

18

already got because life is short, but I certainly resent the

19

fact that he's bringing it up again.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. MALOUF:

Okay.
So on the thing that the commissioner

22

did, he agreed with Jackie's interpretation of the decree that

23

the only thing that gets adjusted is to equalize their alimony

24

when they are both drawing social security.

25

that was referred to in mediation that was before the decree
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1

didn't necessarily make it into the decree.

2

says in Paragraph 12 is the alimony will be adjusted to

3

equalize social security incomes of both the parties.

4

What the decree

And then this is the thing that commissioner made his

r-=,

5

ruling on.

6

There's two paragraphs in Paragraph 12, but the second one goes

7

on to say, for example, if petitioner's monthly social security

8

income is $2000 and petitioner's -- if respondent's is $2000,

9

petitioner's is $1000, this will require an alimony payment of

10

$500 to the petitioner to equalize the monthly social security

11

incomes.

12

It's the example, the example in Paragraph 12.

But there's nothing in the decree that supports the

13

interpretation that defendant is trying to use which really is

14

an attempt to modify the decree.

15

are seeking now and that they sought with the commissioner was

And the interpretation they
GrrJ

16

to interpret the decree that there is no other alimony paid

17

because right now the $1100 is ordered to be paid and the only

18

thing that's to be modified according to the decree is the

19

equalization of the social security that would adjust -- they

20

would adjust alimony to accomplish that up or down, but it

21

doesn't say and all other alimony ends.

22

~

That's nowhere in the decree, but they want to

23

interpret it that way.

So that when they both are both on

24

social security, no one is going to have to file a petition for

25

modification.

We don't think that's fair that John, that is
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1

the respondent, has around an $83,000 a year job with the city.

2

That includes his benefit packages.

3

He also in the decree got all of his retirement, the pension

4

and the 401-K as part of the arrangement, so that means that

5

when he does go on social security, he'll get all of that too.
So the only thing that needs to be equalized is their

6

~ ..,

c-.

He's continuing to work.

7

social security incomes.

8

are both actually getting it according to the commissioner 1 s

9

interpretation of the decree which relied heavily on the

10

example in the decree.

11

eligible at 62.

12

or $937.

13

not.

And the time to do that is when they

For example, yes, everyone can be

I think Jackie would be eligible to get $935

John would be eligible to get something, but he's

14

I would suspect he's doing the financially wise thing

15

in continuing to work until he's close to 70 if he chooses, but

16

certainly until he's full retirement age at 66.

17

that point if he wants to petition

18

their social security incomes, but he would also need a

19

petition to modify if he's going to drop alimony entirely and

20

only pay enough to equalize it.

21

And then at

he 1 s got to equalize

Now, the thing that -- that's my response to the

22

argument we've heard so far and my argument in favor of what

23

commissioner ruled.

24

the hearing with Commissioner Garner

25

THE COURT:

Now, it is true, your Honor, that after

Go ahead.

I'm just looking at the
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1

2

,,.,

decree.
MR. MALOUF:

Okay.

That Jacqueline also filed an

3

objection to two things.

4

awarded attorney's fees in the hearing.

5

petition to even get alimony (inaudible) because John applied

6

his interpretation of the decree beginning January and paid her

7

like 300 bucks or 279 or something, anyway less than 1100 by

8

more than half and quit paying it until we got to the

9

Commissioner's hearing.

One of them was that she wasn't
She had to file a

We had to have a hearing in order to

10

get the alimony reinstated and get this ruling and she

11

shouldn't have got attorney's fees.

12

The other thing we're asking for is to have her

13

petition for modification heard.

14

heretofore, today that she's not working.

15

not working.

16

health to work.

17

Now, there's been discussion

She's not been able to work.

And it's true she's
She's not had the

She filed a petition in 2010 to modify.

That's when

18

Mr. Hult was representing her.

19

it's been so long that I'm just going to say you can't have

20

that heard now.

21

decision that would have allowed it and that was the Johnson

22

versus Firebrand, Inc. decision, a Utah decision back in 1977

23

which supports the idea that it would be an abuse of the trial

24

court's discretion to grant a motion to dismiss where either

25

party could have obtained relief to bring the case to a

And the commissioner said well

It's been that long, but we did refer to a
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1

conclusion but didn't do so for merely four years.
The argument that respondent made in asking the

2
3

commissioner to say you can't have your petition to modify here

4

is she didn't do anything to bring it forward for four years.

5

And that's true she didn't.

6

Nathan Hult had health issues.

7

person.

8

to modify.

9

initially brought to the Court's attention because we wanted it

She had a different attorney.
He retired.

She was a fearful

When I saw the case, I said well here's this petition
It's been sitting here.

And that's what we

~

,..,

~
Fllf

pq,

~

...

10

heard, but during that four years, although she didn't do

11

anything about it, neither did the other side file any motion

12

to dismiss it.

13

So we were thinking even though it's been four years,

14

it would be equitable to allow her petition for modification to

15

be heard so she could put on her evidence about the health

16

problems she's had, the difficulty and impossibility she had in

17

finding employment, and that her needs were such that she could

18

not have the income that was actually had at the time of the

19

decree because she couldn't, just couldn't sustain it so she's

20

doing without.

21

So the two things we were asking for is the

22

attorney's fees on the hearing.

We asked for 1820 bucks,

23

because that's what it was.

24

that in order to prepare and have that hearing with

25

Commissioner Garner.

Actually it was a little more than

And then she wanted to have her petition
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1

to modify that had been filed in 2010 be able to come on for a

2

hearing.

3

heard because she'd have a retroactive effect of whatever is

4

equitable or to the actual filing if she could have the

5

evidence to support it whereas a petition to modify now

6

wouldn't have such a long standing effect.

7

Thanks for hosting us.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. THOMAS:

It would be to her advantage of course to have it

Thank you.
Okay.

Mr. Thomas.

Reply to regard with the issue of

10

alimony.

We're not saying alimony is completely dismissed

11

with, done away with, things like that.

12

social security under the decree substitutes in for a portion

13

of it.

14

We're not saying alimony completely goes away.

15

it's modified basically automatically under the decree.

That's what the decree says.

What we're saying is

That's what we're saying.
We're saying

Also, what they are talking about is what my client

16
17

makes, stuff like that.

18

alimony money than she would have gotten from the Court.

19

wanted it front loaded.

20

deal.

21

wants more.

22

(inaudible) property.

23

settlement because it was all tied together.

24
25

Well, we had a deal.

That's what we did.

She wanted it front loaded.

She got more
She

And this is the

We gave her that.

Now she

Now, my guy got his retirement, she wants
We're not going to undo the property

One of the things when they are talking about
attorney's fees, let's look at what happened, though.
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1

a motion in February, an order to show cause, a motion to

2

dismiss to bring this issue before the Court.

3

for about a month.

4

The issue of alimony, what it was going to be, we brought it to

5

the Court.

6

to the Court to deal with it.

...

They didn't bring it to the Court.

We brought it

8

this on and try and tag my guy for attorney's fees if you look

9

at the order of when things were filed.

And so I don't think

10

attorney's fees are appropriate because one is if you read

11

this, it's fairly clear.

12

when the petitioner becomes eligible.

13

sure to be careful we brought that to the Court's attention.

14

And they sat on it and wanted to file a counter-order to show

15

cause to try to have my guy held in contempt and get attorney's

16

fees.

17

already going to be before the Court.

18

unreasonable and unnecessary attorney's fees.

19

-

Then they finally filed a counter-motion.

And then all of a sudden they wanted her to piggy

7

~

They sat on it

It's very clear actually.

It says

And so we want to make

I don't think that's appropriate because the issue was

Okay.

They incurred

Also, {inaudible) a possibility she hasn't

20

been working, but she's also had plenty of rental income that

21

she's not really disclosed, but before I move on, do you have

22

any questions regarding the language of the decree?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. THOMAS:

25

No.
Okay.

On the motion to dismiss, what I

think the Court should really look at is in the memorandum that
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1

I cited to the Court I cited two cases.

One of them was Meadow

2

Fresh Farms versus Utah State University Department of

3

Agriculture.

4

that a party's failure to communicate with its counsel does not

5

satisfy the excusable neglect standard required to set aside a

6

judgment under Rule 60-b.

7

41 and 60, basically why did you sit on your duff and why did

8

you not prosecute the case.

And it says the Utah Supreme Court has indicated

Because they are sort of comparing

And it says in sum a plaintiff in attacking a

9

10

dismissal for failure to prosecute must offer a reasonable

11

excuse for its lack of diligence.

12

reason.

13

given a good reason why.

14

was too nervous to come to court.

15

like the process.

16

never come up with a reason why she didn't pursue her petition.

She's really never said any

Before Judge Willmore, before (inaudible) she's never
~

17

I mean the only thing she said is she
She didn't like it.

That's what she told Judge Willmore.

Didn't
She's

And in the case of Country Meadows versus Utah

18

Department of Health the Court has said that Rule 41-b required

19

plaintiffs to prosecute their claims with due diligence or

20

accept the penalty of dismissal.

21

I understand the Court's ruling, but it says on the other hand

22

the Supreme Court has noted that if Rule 41-b, Utah Rules of

23

Civil Procedure, is to effective in expediting and resolving

24

litigation, it must require litigants to prosecute their claim

25

with due diligence.

I mean this is discretionary.
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Okay.

She's made this claim that well Mr. Hult

2

retired.

3

anything to do.

4

Miss Ferron representing her for a certain amount of time.

5

That's why we made part of the distribution to the Countrywide

6

{inaudible), so she's had -- and Mr. Hult was sending me

7

letters during this time which I've laid out in my client's

8

declaration.

9

attorney engaged during much of this time, but she chose not to

10

prosecute.

I didn't know what was going on.
I didn't know what to do.

I didn't have
Well, she also had

I'd been dealing with Miss Ferron.

So she had an

She sat it on for four years.
And let me tell you why this is important, though.

11

12

In the last four years my client is earning more money.

13

what her plan is based upon the discovery requests she's made

14

is she wants to tag him for any kind of deficiency.

15

can get the Court to ignore the language of the decree and then

16

say well I'm not working, I can't do it, whatever reason, yet

17

she wants additional alimony.

18

dollars a month for like 57 months, that's another $5700.

And so

So if she

If that's like another hundred

If it's $200 a month -- basically she sat on it for

19

20

no reason.

And the only thing that's changed since then is my

21

client hasn't gotten raises.

22

think that's one of the other factors that Commissioner

23

Willmore took into consideration is, one, she didn't do

24

anything for several years.

25

not doing anything for several years.

I don't think (inaudible).

I

She didn't offer a good reason for
And three, it's not fair
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1

to try to tag my guy.

2

otherwise I'll start doing that in every case.

3

receiving alimony, I'll file a petition to modify, throw it in

5

the Court's file and let it sit there for a few years until the

6

payer spouse is getting more money from natural raises.

7

don't think that is equitable and I don't think it's

8

appropriate, but under Rule 41-b they have not offered any

9

reason that they haven't done anything on our petition to

11

I

modify in four and a half years.
THE COURT:

All right.

First of all, I appreciate

12

your arguments.

13

this in trying to understand the issues.

It's obvious that both of you have worked on

14

MR. MALOUF:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MALOUF:

17

-

What I'll do is if I represent a client who is

4

10

...

You just sit on it for no reason because

May I state something in reply?
Yes, but let's make it quick.
We were the first ones that did file an

objection to commissioner's recommendation.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. MALOUF:

Right.
I just want to point out that the

20

initial pleading that we filed on behalf of Jackie was a

21

request for scheduling conference on her old at that time

22

petition to modify.

23

quit paying alimony and filed a motion which contrary to what

24

he argued today was that the only amount he has to pay is

25

enough to equalize something on that social security and

It was after that that Jonathan's client
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1

2

obviously quit paying everything else.
So his desired interpretation at that time was to pay

3

nothing except what it takes to equalize it.

4

that Jackie's hearing in order to keep alimony was essential

5

and we think it's equitable that she be able to have the

6

hearing for petition to modify heard.

7

So we believe

You had issued a one-page memorandum of decision in

8

February on the 9th (inaudible) and you said you wanted to

9

hear, first of all, what the commissioner had to say on both

10

those issues.

11

social security equalization and it was also on the petition to

12

modify, but Jackie then and now and so far has not had an

13

opportunity to present any testimony about her reasons for

14

delay so here we are.

15

The first was on -- by that point it was on the

THE COURT:

Thank you very much.
Okay.

Thank you.

All right.

The Court

16

finds that -- the court first of all is denying both objections

17

to the commissioner's findings.

18

reasoning compelling on both sides to deny them.

19

counsel interprets becomes eligible to receive social security

20

as crystal clear, but the Court does not find it that way.

21

I find the arguments and
I know that

I do find that the examples that they give underneath

22

more fit in line with what would be interpreted to mean become

23

eligible to receive social security so I'm going to affirm the

24

commissioner's findings on both ends.

25

MR. THOMAS:

Will you explain a little bit.
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1

what point can my guy retire?

2

affect?

3

as long as· possible, I mean could he retire now and this would

4

be implemented ed?

5

ed?

7

At what point is this language implemented

When the petitioner begins to receive

social security income.

8

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.

9

MR. MALOUF:

Wait a minute.

The example is when they

10

both are receiving, your Honor, so I'm unclear what question is

11

being answered.
THE COURT:

12

Well, when the petitioner becomes

13

eligible to receive social security income, because otherwise

14

they would have just said both of them.
MR. MALOUF:

15

•C-,

Well, the presumption was since he's two

16

years older, he'd have started earlier.

17

they had in mind.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. THOMAS:

20

THE COURT:

That's really what

I understand that but.
Is she receiving social security income

Is she receiving social security income

now?

23

MR. MALOUF:

24

THE COURT:

25

~

now?

21
22

~

I mean, does he have to wait -- if she decides to wait

THE COURT:

6

When will this actually take

She's applied for early social security.
Well, I read somewhere where she had

withdrawn her application.
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1

MR. MALOUF:

I don't know for sure what the

2

status is, but the interpretation that the commissioner gave

3

that you said you're not changing is the only time this becomes

4

operative is when they are both receiving.

5

ruled.
THE COURT:

6
7

That's what he

Let's take a few minutes and go in

chambers.

8

THE BAILIFF:

9

(Recess was taken.)

10

Court will be in recess.

Court had an opportunity to visit with the attorneys

11

in chambers.

12

issue.

13

as it could have been so the Court is going to take this under

14

advisement and try and come up with the best decision it can.

15

In the meantime continue paying the $1100 a month in alimony

16

and I will have my decision out here as fast as I can.

I appreciate their input.

This is a sticky

Obviously the drafting of the agreement is not as clear

MR. THOMAS:

17

Also, I believe you said, your Honor,

18

that basically if your Honor comes down, factors in she is

19

receiving the alimony, he would get a credit for paying.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. THOMAS:

22

we're clear on that.

23

THE COURT:

24

...

She had.

25

too.

Correct.

All right.

Just wanted to make sure

Also, we can resolve this really quickly

Well, no, we can't.
MR. THOMAS:

Correct.

We can't.

Understood.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. THOMAS:

Okay.

Thank you.

~

Thank you.

3
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4
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